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ABSTRACT 
The contingent perspective in strategic human resource management maintains that it is 
necessary to observe the interaction between human resource practices by encouraging 
external and internal labor flexibility. An issue still to be resolved is whether this fit leads to a 
complementary or substitute effect on firm performance. In order to contribute to this debate, 
in this study we examine how the relationship between external labor flexibility and firm 
performance is moderated by the degree of internal labor flexibility. To do this, we use the 
Survey on Business Strategies of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade on a sample of 
1,403 Spanish industrial firms. The results show the existence of a substitute effect between 
the two types of labor flexibility. Using them simultaneously does not lead to greater benefits 
for firms. 
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Since the ’90s, greater international competition, the speed of technological change 
and more volatile and segmented markets in Europe have contributed to the demand by 
business people for greater labor flexibility. In this context, research interest has been aimed 
at analyzing human resource practices, increasing employees’ skills and promoting their 
commitment as the real causes of greater labor flexibility. This approach focuses on the 
human capital existing in the firm, that is, in the knowledge and skills of the current 
employees, as the best means to achieve labor flexibility (Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002; Groot 
and Van Den Brink, 2000; Huang and Cullen, 2001). It involves high levels of skills and a 
collaborative approach to work, and uses high-quality labor. In accordance with this approach, 
human resource practices associated with functional flexibility are encouraged, including the 
selection of employees with a high level of education, extensive training and the use of self-
managed teams or job rotation (Atkinson, 1984; Groot and Van Den Brink, 2000; Kalleberg, 
2001; Michie and Sheehan, 2001,2005). This approach has been called internal labor 
flexibility. However, reality shows us that not all firms have faith in this approach. An 
important proportion of firms have adopted human resource practices based on temporary 
contracts and part-time work as the predominant approach in fostering competitiveness 
through labor flexibility. This second approach comprises human resource practices seeking 
numerical flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Michie and Sheehan, 2001,2005; McIlroy, et al., 2004; 
Valverde et al., 2000). This is a market-focused approach, in which flexibility is the result of 
external movement of employees. This approach has been called external labor flexibility.  
Concerning the two approaches, in the last few years recourse to external labor 
flexibility has become the central core around which employment policy – seeking a solution 
for unemployment – in the European Union has been based (Albert et al., 2005; EC, 
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2005,2004). In particular, in Spain, firms have developed external labor flexibility largely 
through temporary contracts, rather than through other practices such as part-time work or 
subcontracting (EC, 2005,2004; Sánchez and Toharia, 2000; Ruiz-Santos et al., 2003). The 
generalization of this type of contract in Spain has led to the so-called “temporary contract 
culture” (Toharia, 2005). As a result, much of the empirical research in the Spanish sphere 
focuses on characterizing temporary jobs (e.g. Alba-Ramirez, 1994; Lloréns-Montes et al., 
2004; Toharia, 2005) and identifying the reasons why they are intensively used (e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2001; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Ruiz-Santos, et al., 2003). However, in Spain, as 
well as in other countries, the empirical literature analyzing the effect of temporary contracts, 
as the predominant form of external labor flexibility, on firm performance is still scarce 
(Forrier and Sels, 2003; Lepak et al., 2003). 
At the same time, although both labor flexibility approaches are conceptually different, 
the issue of whether they are mutually exclusive in business practice has still not been 
resolved. However there is a degree of agreement on the fact that the different human 
resource management practices and policies must be inter-related (Baird and Meshoulam, 
1988; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). These inter-relationships 
mean that the effect of a practice on firm performance can vary significantly depending on the 
implementation of another series of practices. The existence of this internal fit is included in 
the contingent view of strategic human resource management (Becker and Gerhart, 1996; 
Delery and Doty, 1996). In accordance with the contingent approach, and in the particular 
subject of the study of labor flexibility, some researchers (e.g., Capelli and Neumark, 2004; 
Kalleberg, 2001; Lepak and Snell, 2002; Lepak et al., 2003; Tüselmann, 1996) state that 
external and internal labor flexibility are interdependent approaches and call for research on 
strategic human resource management to consider the effect of this fit on firm performance.  
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In this respect, there are two alternative hypotheses explaining the nature of the effect 
of fit on firm performance. While authors such as Appelbaum et al., (2000) and Tüselmann 
(1996) maintain the existence of a “substitute effect” between the two labor flexibility 
approaches, Kalleberg (2001) and Lepak et al., (2003), by contrast, postulate the existence of 
a “complementary effect”. The key question is whether the two approaches to achieving labor 
flexibility are compatible. The scarcity of empirical evidence makes it difficult to recognize 
which of the two effects predominates (Capelli and Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 2001). The 
purpose of this study is precisely to examine this issue. Given the generalization of temporary 
contracts among Spanish firms, we analyze the effect of external labor flexibility (represented 
by the use of temporary contracts) on firm performance, depending on the level of internal 
labor flexibility. 
We then present an overview of the literature on labor flexibility, the different types of 
labor flexibility and their particular implementation in Spain. Following this, we explain the 
importance of considering the fit between the different human resource practices and policies, 
focusing our attention on the interaction that exists between external and internal labor 
flexibility and formulating our research hypotheses. In the empirical section, we describe the 
sample, the measurements used to define the variables and the statistical procedure developed 
for examining the proposed hypotheses. Deriving from this analysis, the results obtained are 
presented and interpreted. Finally, we explain the conclusions of the study, its theoretical and 
practical implications for business management and future lines of research stemming from 
this study. 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
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2.1 Two approaches to achieving labor flexibility: the Spanish model  
Faced with the incessant increase in competition and uncertainty, organizations need 
the capacity to adapt quickly to market fluctuations and changes in their environment to 
maintain their competitiveness and survive. This requirement for flexibility has appeared in 
various organizational aspects, affecting competitive strategies, production methods, the 
design of organizational structures and human resource management (Atkinson, 1984; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Michie and Sheehan, 2001.2005; Roca-Puig et al., 2005; Youndt et al., 
1996). In this last aspect, capacity for adaptation is defined as labor flexibility. This concept 
covers very different kinds of human resource management policies and practices, which have 
been grouped into two basic categories:1 internal or functional flexibility and external or 
numerical flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Kalleberg, 2001; McIlroy, et al., 2004). These two 
types of labor flexibility are linked, respectively, with the typical “soft” and “hard” models 
(Truss et al., 1997) established in the literature on strategic human resource management. The 
first emphasizes employees’ commitment to the organization and, therefore, internal 
flexibility, while the second emphasizes control of employees and cost reduction (Bacon and 
Blyton, 2001; Blyton and Morris, 1992; Cappelli and Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 2001). 
Looise et al., (1998) and Michie and Sheehan (2001) relate the concept of internal 
labor flexibility with employee functional flexibility, understood as the ease with which 
people can move between tasks and jobs in the organization. Internal flexibility refers to the 
effort made by the firm to incorporate and develop workers’ competences and skills, so that a 
worker can be assigned to other jobs or departments within the firm. From this perspective, it 
is believed that labor flexibility is determined according to the extent of employee knowledge 
and skills. Organizations can adopt various human resource management practices in order to 
improve internal flexibility. These efforts may be directed towards hiring employees with a 
high level of education, who have greater skills and knowledge, and improving the 
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capabilities of employees already hired by the firm through continuous training (Delaney and 
Huselid, 1996; Smith et al., 2005; Way, 2002). The firm’s efforts to select employees with a 
high level of education and investment in training are of great importance in this context 
because the human capital generated by these two elements is critical to the development of 
internal flexibility (Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002; Huang and Cullen, 2001). Employees with 
higher levels of education are likely to be more receptive to new ideas and change (Smith et 
al., 2005). In addition, selection and training are interdependent practices (Delaney and 
Huselid, 1996; MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt et al; 1996). These two practices interact with each 
other to produce greater employability. A higher level of education and greater investment in 
training raises the level of employability of employees, encouraging mobility between jobs 
within a firm (Groot and Van Den Brink, 2000). This improved employability means that 
employees can adapt better to their work and to technical, economic and production changes, 
thus fostering their internal flexibility.    
  External labor flexibility concerns the capacity to change the number of workers 
hired in order to quickly and efficiently adapt the volume of work to changes in demand. The 
benefits associated with this policy are focused on a greater capacity to adapt and on the lower 
fixed labor costs incurred (Matusik and Hill, 1998). At the same time, this policy can be 
counterproductive if its use works against the firm’s commitment to hiring, developing and 
retaining the most skilled workers (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Although this kind of labor 
flexibility can take the form of subcontracting or part-time working, in Spain it is normally 
achieved through temporary contracts (Ruiz-Santos et al., 2003; Toharia, 2005). The two 
basic reasons for the use of temporary contracts are to shield regular employees from 
unemployment when the employer’s demand is temporarily reduced and to have the power to 
deal with greater variability in production volume without the need to increase the size of the 
fixed workforce (Gramm and Schnell, 2001; Valverde et al., 2000).  
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The generalized use of temporary contracts in Spain needs to be understood in its own 
socioeconomic context. It is necessary to locate issues of flexibility more securely within both 
existing national regulatory and institutional frameworks (Blyton and Martínez-Lucio, 1995; 
Kalleberg, 2001). The serious unemployment situation in the ’80s in Spain led to temporary 
contracts becoming generally permitted (Toharia, 2005) without the need to give reasons. 
Consequently, even after the regulation reforms of 1994, 1997 and 2001, completely 
recovering the principle of causality and restricting the use of temporary contracts, according 
to the EC (2005), Spain is still the European country with the highest use of this kind of 
contracts. These high levels of temporary employment are resistant, partly due to the 
extremely high dismissal costs entailed by a permanent contract in Spain, the use of trade 
unions to constrain employers’ discretion over issues such as the movement of workers 
through jobs and the use of some types of temporary contracts to hire workers without bearing 
the cost of dismissals (Blyton and Martínez-Lucio, 1995; Toharia, 2005). In addition to these 
economic reasons, Spanish employers have become so used to temporary contracting that a 
temporary culture has been created, that to a certain extent, has fostered its own overuse. 
Temporary contracts are used because everybody uses them (Toharia, 2005). The growing 
interest aroused among researchers in examining the use of temporary contracts as a practice 
representing external labor flexibility is therefore understandable (e.g. Albert et al., 2005; 
Amuedo-Dorantes, 2001; Lloréns-Montes et al., 2004; Ruiz-Santos, et al., 2003). However, 
little empirical evidence can yet be found about the business benefits and disadvantages 
associated with the use of temporary contracts. Although studies have been conducted at 
aggregate labor market level (e.g. Toharia, 2005) and at employee level (e.g. Valverde et al., 
2000), studies at firm level complementing these two are required (Kalleberg, 2001).   
In the Spanish case, at firm level the studies by Sánchez and Toharia (2000) and Díaz-
Mayans and Sánchez (2004) should be highlighted. Sánchez and Toharia (2000) use the 
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Survey on Business Strategies -Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE)- by the 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade for a sample of 962 firms during the period 1990 to 
1994, and show that temporary contracts have a negative effect on labor productivity. In the 
same way, Díaz-Mayans and Sánchez (2004), using a sample of 180 firms from the ESEE 
from 1999 to 2001, show that temporary contracts have a negative effect on the technical 
efficiency of Spanish industrial firms. According to these authors, an increase in the 
proportion of temporary contracts has a negative effect on the firm’s workers’ average level 
of effort. The main reason for this negative effect can be found in the fact that this temporary 
contract policy breaks the stability of relations between workers and the firm, affecting the 
overall level of involvement of the workers with the firm and their commitment to it. The low 
level of qualification of temporary employees and the short period of time they remain with 
the firm are also factors aggravating the situation.   
2.2 The contingent view of strategic human resource management 
Despite the unquestionable value of isolated analyses of internal and external labor 
flexibility, human resource management should be observed holistically, considering the 
inter-relationships between human resource management practices linked to labor flexibility. 
This leads us to strategic human resource management. Wright and McMahan (1992) define 
strategic human resource management as the system of human resource management policies 
and practices developed to achieve organizational objectives. Its two basic features are 
implicit in this definition.  
Firstly, human resource management must be observed as a system – an integrated 
whole – in which the different practices are inter-related (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988; 
Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). The focus of attention is the set 
or combination of the various practices, and studying any of them independently is 
meaningless. In addition, it is also important to examine the inter-relationships between 
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human resource management practices and other organizational characteristics, such as firm 
strategy (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988; Delery and Doty 1996). The underlying logic is the 
general assumption that the congruence between various human resource practices (internal 
fit) and between these practices and other contextual factors (external fit) will improve firm 
performance. The contingent approach has been the most common one in the empirical 
studies of strategic human resource management (e.g. Lepak et al., 2003; MacDuffie, 1995; 
Youndt et al., 1996).  
Secondly, the objective of strategic human resource management is to contribute to the 
improvement in firm performance, the basic objective of any organization (Becker and 
Gerhart, 1996). Many studies have tried to demonstrate its effect on firm performance as a 
means of justifying its importance for competitiveness (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Delery and Doty 
1996). In this respect, the contingent perspective maintains that a certain human resource 
management practice produces an effect on firm performance of a different intensity, 
depending on the use of other practices, organizational characteristics or contextual factors 
(Roca-Puig et al., 2005). The implementation of contradictory practices will make negative 
synergies appear, reducing the contribution of the human resource management system 
considered as part of business performance as a whole (MacDuffie, 1995; Marchington and 
Grugulis, 2000). On the other hand, the implementation of complementary practices will 
make positive synergies appear, increasing the contribution of the human resource 
management system to firm performance. Transferring the contributions of the contingent 
approach to our research, our focus of interest is the study of external flexibility and its effect 
on business performance, analyzing the degree to which internal flexibility acts as a variable 
moderating this effect.  
2.3. The effect of the fit between external and internal labor flexibility on firm 
performance 
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The application of the contingent approach to labor flexibility has a solid technical and 
empirical basis, as the different human resource practices associated with flexibility are inter-
related. In this respect, it must firstly be highlighted that many studies have demonstrated the 
existence of a positive inter-relationship between the two basic policies linked to internal 
flexibility – level of education and the training received by employees (De Saá-Pérez and 
García-Falcón, 2002; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Groot and Van Den Brink, 2000). Both the 
use of selection procedures providing a firm with a group of qualified employees and the 
emphasis on continuous training lead to high skill levels. Secondly, concerning the 
relationship between the different types of flexibility practice, Ruiz et al., (2003) and Forrier 
and Sels (2003) show that there is a negative inter-relationship between the use of temporary 
contracts and investment in training by the firm. In other words, firms with high external 
flexibility show less interest in training their employees. However, Osterman (2000) and 
Bacon and Blyton (2001) indicate the existence of a positive inter-relationship between both 
types of labor flexibility. According to these authors, nowadays firms try to combine practices 
associated with both types of labor flexibility, given that firms with a high level of external 
flexibility are, at the same time, those which invest most in and are most concerned with 
training their employees.  
These studies reveal the importance of understanding human resource management, 
considering all labor flexibility practices as a whole, and examining the interdependence 
between external and internal types of flexibility (Cappelli and Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 
2001, Lepak and Snell, 2002). However, these studies have focused on analyzing the inter-
relationships between both types of flexibility without dealing with their influence on results. 
Despite the consensus among the researchers about the existence of a fit between the different 
practices associated with labor flexibility, agreement does not yet exist on how this interaction 
affects firm performance. This issue is extended by the scarcity of empirical evidence at 
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organizational level (see Lepak et al., 2003 as an exception). Basically, arguments exist for 
two alternative effects: substitute and complementary effects (Cappelli and Neumark, 2004; 
Lepak et al., 2003).  
The substitute effect between external and internal flexibility maintains the existence 
of a series of costs and compensations associated with trying to improve a particular kind of 
labor flexibility (Tüselmann, 1996). This incompatibility has been a recurring idea in the 
literature, with authors examining the effectiveness of the simultaneous implementation of the 
“soft” and “hard” models in human resource management (e.g. Becker and Gerhart, 1996; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Huselid, 1995). According to these authors, in a firm context like the one 
described by Osterman (2000) and Bacon and Blyton (2001), characterized by high levels of 
both external and internal labor flexibility, it is unlikely that the firm will achieve very good 
performance. The incongruence between the simultaneous use of “soft” practices – emphasis 
on training employees – and “hard” practices – temporary contracts – leads to the appearance 
of a negative interaction between them, which will reduce firm performance. Highly skilled 
employees and job security are basic requirements for the soft human resource management 
model. Because of this, the greater the job insecurity generated by temporary contracts, the 
lower workers’ commitment to the firm, and labor productivity and firm profitability will 
therefore be reduced.  
In addition, as in the Spanish case, because the majority of temporary employees 
contracted by firms are characterized by a low educational level, low wages, and the firms 
that invest most in training are the ones that least use temporary contracts (Albert et al., 2005), 
it is difficult to implement the soft model (Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 2004). Moreover, in the 
Spanish context there are unresolved shortcomings in training provision and employee 
qualifications that continue to hinder the development of internal flexibility. In these labor 
market conditions, it is problematic for managers to employ people on precarious (and often 
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poorly paid) contracts and, at the same time, seek employee commitment and high quality 
output (Blyton and Morris, 1992). As a result, there is a conflict between the use of external 
flexibility and the practices associated with the “soft” model (Michie and Sheehan, 2001). 
The goal of promoting external flexibility is not compatible with the aim of enhancing 
employees’ ability to perform a variety of jobs through the acquisition of skills (Arulampalam 
and Booth, 1998). In addition, Appelbaum et al., (2000), Arnone et al., (2005) and 
Arulampalam and Booth, (1998) declare that greater firm investment in training workers will 
be more efficient when the firm follows a policy of permanent employment contracts, because 
the firm can amortize its investment.   
Ultimately, a high level of external flexibility does not provide a favorable business 
context for benefiting from the promotion of internal flexibility, and vice-versa. A firm will 
probably choose an employment context in which only one of these types of flexibility will 
predominate. Their antagonism means that, the greater a firm’s internal flexibility, the smaller 
the positive effect of external flexibility on performance, which could even turn out to be 
negative. At the same time, the lower a firm’s internal flexibility, the greater the positive 
effect of external flexibility on performance. The final result of the appearance of this 
substitute effect would be the existence of a significant difference in the effect of external 
flexibility on firm performance, depending on the level of internal flexibility, so that:  
Hypothesis 1. When internal flexibility is low, external flexibility exercises a greater 
positive effect on firm performance than in a situation with a high level of internal 
flexibility (substitute effect). 
Another series of authors maintain the existence of a complementary effect between 
the external and internal types of labor flexibility (e.g. Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Jiang and 
Cheng, 2004; Kalleberg 2001; Lepak et al., 2003; Matusik and Hill, 1988). According to 
these authors, the business context described by Osterman (2000) and Bacon and Blyton 
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(2001) would be the most beneficial one. The original idea of this effective combination is the 
core vs. peripheral employee model put forward by Atkinson (1984) and Atkinson and 
Meager (1986), in which a firm can make both types of flexibility compatible by making an 
explicit distinction between these two categories of workers. So, while the firm would 
concentrate its efforts on training and developing its core employees, providing the firm with 
internal flexibility, temporary contracting would be concentrated on peripheral workers, 
providing the firm with external flexibility. In this way, firms can take advantage of both 
types of labor flexibility, maximizing their benefits (Kalleberg, 2001; Lepak et al., 2003). In 
addition, it may be that job security is not a necessary condition for workers’ commitment to 
the firm, which would make it possible for the benefits of both types of labor flexibility not to 
be mutually exclusive (Cappelli and Neumark, 2004). 
Given that, at firm level, there is very little evidence of the appearance of this 
complementary effect, we will detail two recent empirical studies which support this 
proposition, if only partially. Firstly, for a sample of 148 large North American firms, Lepak 
et al., (2003) obtain moderate empirical evidence that economic performance is better for 
firms that simultaneously use external and internal flexibility. These authors conclude that 
there is compatibility between both types of labor flexibility. On the other hand,  based on a 
sample of 114 industrial Chinese firms, Jiang and Cheng (2004) obtain similar results when 
they examine the effect of both types of labor flexibility on employee performance. However, 
when they use an economic performance indicator, they conclude that the most profitable 
combination appears when high internal flexibility is combined with low external flexibility. 
Given the divergence of results depending on the performance indicator used, they also 
provide moderate empirical evidence on the potential usefulness of combining both types of 
labor flexibility.  
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Ultimately, the identification of a complementary effect means that, the greater a 
firm’s internal flexibility, the greater the positive effect of external flexibility on performance. 
A firm must establish a labor context in which there is a high level of both types of flexibility. 
Firm performance will be better in organizations with high external and internal flexibility 
than in other organizations that emphasize only one of these types of labor flexibility. The 
final result of the appearance of this complementary effect would be the existence of a 
significant difference in the effect of external flexibility on firm performance, depending on 
the level of internal flexibility, so that: 
Hypothesis 2. When internal flexibility is high, external flexibility exercises a greater 
positive effect on firm performance than in a situation with a lower level of internal 




To empirically test the theoretical hypotheses put forward, we used the Survey on 
Business Strategies (ESEE)2 carried out by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. The 
reference population for the ESEE is made up of firms with 10 or more workers in 
manufacturing industry, excluding industrial activities related to oil refining and the treatment 
of fuels. The geographical area includes Spanish territory, and all the variables are measured 
with an annual time reference. In our study, we use data from 2002, which is the last period 
when the survey was carried out. From the original sample of firms (1,635 firms), cases with 
missing data for any of the variables included  in the study were eliminated (90 firms), 
together with cases with coding errors (125 firms) and non-standard cases (17 firms) that 
could devalue the information provided for that year, such as firms affected by takeover, 
merger or separation processes. The final sample used in this study was 1,403 firms. 
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Distribution by sector of activity can be seen in Table 1, both through the Standard Industrial 
Classification system (SIC) and the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities –
Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE)-.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 
------------------------ 
3.2. Measurements 
Control variables. Following the example of studies by Huselid (1995), Lepak et al., 
(2003) and Way (2002), six control variables were selected: age of the organization, its size, 
its degree of dependency, its sector of activity, the labor intensiveness of the firm and its 
innovation intensiveness. Age was calculated as the number of years between the 
establishment of the firm and the date the survey was compiled. Size is defined by the number 
of employees. The level of dependency of the firm is defined as the percentage of the firm’s 
capital held by another firm. For the industrial sector, the CNAE classification was adopted, 
distinguishing 13 sectors of activity. As this is a categorical variable, it is necessary to 
identify a reference category, which will not be included in the regression analysis. In our 
case, we chose the metalwork and metal products manufacturing sector. The other categories 
in the industrial sector are introduced as dummy variables, taking the value of 1 when the firm 
belongs to the corresponding sector and 0 otherwise (see Table 2). The labor intensiveness 
variable was calculated as the ratio between staff costs and total net assets. Finally, the 
innovative inclination of the firm was calculated as the percentage coefficient between R+D 
spending and the firm’s sales.    
Independent variables. In this study, there are three independent variables, each 
related to an external or internal labor flexibility practice. Thus, temporary contracting 
(TEMPOR) is calculated as the ratio between employees with temporary contracts – number 
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of casual workers- and the total number of employees at the firm. Concerning the two 
practices representing internal labor flexibility, we have calculated the educational level of the 
employees (EDUC) using the ratio between the number of workers with a high –engineers 
and graduates- or intermediate –experts, qualified assistants and middle level engineers- 
educational level and the total number of employees in the firm. Investment in training 
(TRNING) is calculated as the ratio between spending on training and the total number of 
employees at the firm.       
Dependent variables. Following the indications of Dyer and Reeves (1995) and Way 
(2002), we identified three different levels for measuring firm performance: employee 
performance, organizational performance and economic performance. To measure employee 
performance we consider the level of absenteeism of employees (ABSENT), measured by the 
number of hours not worked per year (because of industrial dispute, occasional days off work, 
etc.) per person employed by the firm. Concerning organizational performance, we follow 
Way (2002) in choosing labor productivity (PRODUCTV), measured as the logarithm of the 
ratio between sales and staff costs. Finally, concerning economic performance, we chose 
return on sales (ROS). Table 2 shows all these variables – control, independent and dependent 
variables – and their respective descriptive statistics. Table 3 shows the correlation 
coefficients between the variables.   
------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 
------------------------ 
3.3. Statistical procedure 
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The contingent view of strategic human resource management maintains that there is 
an interactive relationship between human resource management practices (Becker and 
Gerhart, 1996; Delery and Doty 1996), and it is appropriate to use moderated regression 
analysis to study this (Venkatraman, 1989). To examine the theoretical hypotheses put 
forward, we follow the recommendations made by Aiken and West (1991). So, the 
independent variables were centered to prevent multicolinearity problems between the 
interaction terms and the variables making them up. Model 1 is limited to examining the 
direct and individual effect of the control variables and the human resource management 
variables on firm performance. The 17 control variables considered and the 3 independent 
variables – TEMP, TRNING and EDUC – appear in Model 1. In Model 2, similarly to 
previous studies (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Lepak et al., 2003), possible second-order interactions 
between the different external and internal labor flexibility practices were added, forming 
three interaction terms in our study -TEMPxTRNING, TEMPxEDUC and TRNINGxEDUC.  
To empirically check the contingent hypotheses formulated in this study, we take 
Model 2 as our base and calculate the simple regression lines of the external flexibility effect 
(principal variable) on firm performance (dependent variable) depending on the level of 
internal flexibility (moderating variable). This involves dichotomizing the two internal labor 
flexibility variables, choosing a standard deviation above and below the corresponding mean 
values for investment in training and the educational level of employees. The high-high 
combination in both variables (TRNING: 185.827; EDUC: 0.146) provides us with a high 
internal labor flexibility scenario. By contrast, the low-low combination provides us with a 
low internal labor flexibility scenario (TRNING: -185.827; EDUC: -0.146). Calculating the 
simple regression lines makes it possible to recognize the effect of external flexibility on 
business performance in each of the two scenarios. The direction of the effect will be given by 
the sign of the regression coefficient (slope). The intensity of the effect will be given by the 
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absolute value of the regression coefficient and its significance will show us whether it is 
statistically different from zero (Aiken and West, 1991). Likewise, the joint effect of both 
types of flexibility on firm performance will be analyzed, based on the graphic representation 
of the simple regression lines.  
Finally, the two hypotheses put forward in the theoretical section are tested, based on 
the t-test of the difference between the regression coefficient (slope) between a pair of simple 
regression lines. This test enables us to detect whether the slopes of a pair of simple 
regression lines differ from one another (Aiken and West, 1991). Hypothesis 1 will be 
confirmed if the slope of the simple regression line for the effect of external flexibility on firm 
performance is more positive in the low internal flexibility scenario than in the high internal 
flexibility scenario. Hypothesis 2 will be confirmed if the slope of the simple regression line 
for the effect of external flexibility on business development is more positive in the high 
internal flexibility scenario than in the low internal flexibility scenario. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis carried out for the three firm 
performance indicators considered in our study. For each model constructed, its determination 
coefficient (R2), the significance test (F) and the respective regression coefficients for the 
variables introduced are presented. The analysis of Model 2 provides empirical evidence that 
supports the basic premise of the contingent perspective: there is significant interaction 
between the different human resource management practices. This is the central reason for the 
importance of examining these practices in an integrated way, introducing their joint effect 
and not limiting ourselves to analyzing their direct effects, which in our case would 
correspond to the examination of Model 1. The conclusion can be very diverse. For example, 
if we were to examine the effect of temporary contracts on return on sales, considering only 
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Model 1 we would reach the conclusion that external flexibility (0.014) does not affect 
financial results. By contrast, if we introduce the interaction between temporary contracts and 
the other two internal flexibility practices, we can show that the three interactions 
(TEMPxTRNING: -0.069; TEMPxEDUC: -0.052; TRNINGxEDUC: 0.052) have a 
significant effect on financial results. Consequently, external flexibility has a clear effect on 
financial results, although moderated by the internal flexibility variables. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 
------------------------ 
The next step is to calculate the simple regression lines for the effect of external 
flexibility on firm performance, depending on high and low levels of internal labor flexibility. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. Concerning employee performance, it is 
demonstrated that in a high internal flexibility scenario, external flexibility does not 
significantly affect employee absenteeism. By contrast, external flexibility has a significant, 
negative effect (-16.383) on employee absenteeism in a low internal flexibility scenario. 
Concerning organizational performance, although a change in the direction of the effect of 
external flexibility on labor productivity can be seen, depending on the level of internal 
flexibility, it is not significant in either of the two scenarios. Concerning financial 
performance, external flexibility has a significant effect on return on sales: negatively (-0.179) 
in a high internal flexibility scenario and positively (0.126) in a low internal flexibility 
business context. Ultimately, in a firm with a high level of internal labor flexibility, an 
increase in external flexibility significantly reduces return on sales; while in a firm with a low 
level of internal labor flexibility, an increase in external flexibility reduces absenteeism and 
increases return on sales. 
------------------------ 
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Insert Table 5 
------------------------ 
The hypotheses put forward are tested using the statistical values of the t statistic of 
the difference between a pair of simple regression lines shown in Table 6. These hypotheses 
require a comparative analysis of the two contexts – high and low internal labor flexibility. In 
addition, we also need to remember the values of the regression coefficients shown in Table 4. 
The necessary condition for the confirmation of Hypothesis 1 is for the regression coefficient 
in the low internal flexibility scenario to be positive and significantly greater than for the high 
internal flexibility scenario. As can be seen in Table 5, this first requirement is met for the 
three firm performance indicators. The sufficient condition is that there is a significant 
difference between the values of the regression coefficients for the two types of labor 
flexibility. This second condition (see Table 6) is met only in the labor productivity (2.144) 
and return on sales (4.290) indices. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed when the 
dependent variables are the indicators for organizational and financial performance. In these 
cases, a substitute effect can be seen between the two types of labor flexibility. The necessary 
condition for the confirmation of Hypothesis 2 is for the regression coefficient in the high 
internal flexibility scenario to be positive and greater than for the low internal flexibility 
scenario. As can be seen in Table 5, this first requirement is not met for any of the three firm 
performance indicators. Therefore, as the first requirement is not verified, we must conclude 
that Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. There is no complementary effect between the two types 
of labor flexibility. Ultimately, the results appear to strongly support the existence of a 
substitute effect between external and internal flexibility.   
------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 
------------------------ 
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From a descriptive point of view, the graphic representation of the simple regression 
lines allows us to identify the most beneficial and the most damaging combinations of the two 
types of labor flexibility for an organization. This joint effect of internal and external labor 
flexibility is explained below for each of the firm performance indicators. The firm 
performance indices shown in these figures were calculated from the high and low values for 
labor flexibility, defined respectively by a standard deviation above (0.199) and below (-0.199) 
their mean value (see Table 1).  
Figure 1 shows how the combination that produces least absenteeism (1.551) – the 
most beneficial – appears when there is high external flexibility together with low internal 
flexibility. On the other hand, the highest level of absenteeism (8.071) is suffered by the most 
inflexible firms, where there is low labor flexibility, both external and internal. In turn, 
flexible firms – those which simultaneously pursue both external and internal flexibility – 
show an intermediate level of absenteeism (5.454). In addition, the presence of a turning point 
in the effect of temporary contracts on employee absenteeism appears. The simple regression 
lines for high and low internal flexibility cross when external flexibility reaches the value of -
0.069. Up to this level of external flexibility, the worst firm performance (greatest 
absenteeism) is found in firms with low internal flexibility, while, once this level has been 
exceeded, it is the firms with high internal flexibility that suffer a greater absenteeism rate. 
Firms with low internal flexibility therefore show the highest and lowest absenteeism indices. 
In a low internal flexibility scenario, temporary contracts are shown to be a highly effective 
practice concerning the level of employee absenteeism. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------------ 
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Figure 2 shows how the combination that produces the lowest level of labor 
productivity (1.210) is shown when low levels of both types of labor flexibility are present. In 
other words, the least flexible firms show the lowest productivity indices. By contrast, the 
highest level of labor productivity (1.495) is enjoyed by firms with high internal flexibility 
and low external flexibility. Flexible firms, meanwhile, show an intermediate value for labor 
productivity (1.373). This graph does not show a turning point, as the two regression lines do 
not cross within the range of external flexibility values. It provides evidence that, for any 
level of external flexibility, a business context characterized by high internal flexibility 
always leads to greater labor productivity than a low internal flexibility scenario. The greatest 
difference in labor productivity – 0.285 – between the two internal flexibility scenarios is 
observed at a low level of external flexibility. This disparity decreases with the increase in 
external flexibility, until it reaches a minimum difference of 0.083. Ultimately, it is observed 
that labor productivity depends, above all, on the degree of internal flexibility and not so 
much on the degree of external flexibility. There is a strong positive association between 
internal flexibility and labor productivity. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 
------------------------ 
Figure 3 shows how the combination of high levels of both types of labor flexibility 
produces the lowest return on sales (0.050). In other words, flexible firms have the poorest 
financial performance. However, a very similar result (0.051) is also obtained by the more 
inflexible firms. The most beneficial combinations appear in hybrid scenarios, especially 
when a high internal flexibility business context is combined with low external flexibility 
(0.122). This diagram shows the presence of a turning point in the effect of temporary 
contracts on financial performance. The simple regression lines for high and low internal 
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flexibility cross when external flexibility reaches the value of 0.032. Up to this level of 
external flexibility, the best financial performance is shown in a business context with high 
internal flexibility, while, once this level is exceeded, it is the business context with low 
internal flexibility that obtains better performance. Therefore, firms with high internal 
flexibility show the highest and lowest return on sales ratios. In a high internal flexibility 
scenario, external flexibility appears as a strongly counterproductive decision. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 
------------------------ 
In general, it must be highlighted that although flexible firms – those simultaneously 
showing both types of labor flexibility – are not the most effective, and even obtain the worst 
financial performance; at the same time it is shown that the most inflexible firms – those 
which do not implement either of these two types of labor flexibility – obtain the highest 
absenteeism index, the lowest labor productivity index and a very mediocre return on sales 
ratio, similar to the worst of those obtained by flexible firms. These results indicate the need 
for labor flexibility in our times as a mechanism for improving firm performance.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The intensive use of temporary contracts as an external labor flexibility practice is a 
representative feature of the Spanish labor market. Its institutionalization in the Spanish 
business context makes the examination of its effect on business competitiveness a priority. In 
this paper, we have approached the study of external labor flexibility from the contingent 
perspective of strategic human resource management. This leads us to introduce the fit 
between the two types of labor flexibility: external and internal. This integrated view of 
human resource management allows us to recognize whether bringing the two types of labor 
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flexibility together in an organization produces a complementary effect on business 
performance or whether, by contrast, a substitute effect appears. In this study, the appearance 
of these effects has been examined exhaustively, based on the use of three business 
performance indicators: the level of employee absenteeism, labor productivity and return on 
sales. Hence, the results of this allow us to determine whether the two types of labor 
flexibility are compatible, and to identify the most appropriate fit and combination between 
external and internal labor flexibility. This is a key issue in human resource management.  
In this respect, internal flexibility is shown to moderate the effect of external 
flexibility on firm performance. Specifically, it is confirmed that, in a business context of high 
internal flexibility, an increase in external flexibility produces a negative effect on the 
financial return on sales ratio. On the other hand, a positive effect appears in a business 
context of low internal flexibility, because an increase in external flexibility reduces the level 
of worker absenteeism and increases the return on sales ratio. In addition, a substantial 
difference between these negative and positive effects is shown. Thus, it is demonstrated that 
the effect of external flexibility on the level of labor productivity is significantly different to 
that on return on sales. Bringing these two characteristics (direction and intensity) together 
corroborates the hypothesis of the substitute effect. This proposition maintains that in a 
business context of low internal flexibility, external flexibility has a greater positive effect on 
business performance than in a business context characterized by high internal flexibility. In 
addition, through descriptive analysis, it is shown that the simultaneous combination of both 
types of labor flexibility is not the most beneficial combination. A firm must choose between 
prioritizing one or other type of labor flexibility. All these results provide sufficient empirical 
evidence on the incompatibility between the two types of labor flexibility.  
In summary, the degree of internal labor flexibility affects the relationship between 
external labor flexibility and firm performance. Internal labor flexibility acts as a moderating 
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variable on this relationship, significantly altering both its direction and its intensity. We must 
therefore highlight the fact that claims of the type “The job security provided by fixed 
contracts increases the commitment of workers to the firm and, therefore, labor productivity 
and firm profitability” may be valid, while contradictory claims of the type “The greater 
capacity for adaptation and efficiency provided by temporary contracts increases labor 
productivity and firm profitability” may also be valid. The legitimacy of these claims will 
depend on the degree of internal labor flexibility implemented in a firm. The first assertion is 
more likely to be true in a business context with high internal flexibility, while the second 
assertion is more likely to be confirmed in a business context with low internal flexibility. 
These findings are especially relevant in the Spanish context, where due to the institutional 
context and the difficulties of reducing temporary employment levels, there is certain concern 
about the negative effects that temporary work may have for the firm’s outcomes (e.g. 
Sánchez and Toharia, 2000; Toharia, 2005). Our results suggest that the effect of external 
labor flexibility strategies on organizational outcomes cannot be examined in isolation, but 
rather should take into account the relative level of internal flexibility promoted by the firm 
through actions such as employee development or the promotion of greater employee 
polyvalence. 
This study has several theoretical implications. Firstly, the confirmation of the 
interaction between the two types of labor flexibility could explain the divergent results of 
previous studies which have examined only the direct effect of external flexibility on firm 
performance. One of the possible causes of this disparity is the different degree of internal 
flexibility of the samples of firms examined. Secondly, our results do not coincide with those 
of Lepak et al., (2003), who revealed that the mixed combination of high external and internal 
labor flexibility obtains the best results in a sample of large American firms. Their study 
shows that an increase in temporary contracts has a positive effect on firm performance, both 
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in a high and low internal labor flexibility scenario. The different socioeconomic context and 
their selection of only large firms could condition the different results of the two both studies 
(Ruiz-Santos et al., 2003; Tüselmann, 1996). In Spain, our results warn of the need to take an 
eclectic position concerning the consequences of the use of temporary contracts. An increase 
in external flexibility can cause both a negative and a positive effect on firm performance, 
depending on the level of internal flexibility.  
These theoretical deductions lead to important consequences for business practice. 
Faced with the decision on whether to increase external flexibility, managers should assess 
the level of internal flexibility in their organization. This decision can have very different 
results. Thus, for example, in firms with low internal labor flexibility – that is, those with little 
investment in training and employees with a low level of education – it could be beneficial to 
increase the number of employees with temporary contracts. On the contrary, for firms with 
high internal flexibility, an increase in external flexibility would be damaging, with a 
significant fall in their level of economic performance. However, it should be highlighted that, 
although the most beneficial combination appears in a labor context characterized by high 
internal flexibility and low external flexibility, another alternative with very good firm 
performance results from a labor context characterized by low internal flexibility and high 
external flexibility. Both combinations are viable alternatives for firms. However, managers 
must note the difficulty of implementing both types of labor flexibility in an organization at 
the same time. The results show that they are not compatible. As Blyton and Morris (1992) 
point out, in European countries such as Spain that pay more attention to those aspects of 
labor flexibility relating to the volume of labor and reducing labor costs (low wages) than to 
longer-term investment in training and qualifications, the simultaneous development of 
internal and external labor flexibility is not possible. These authors argue that the two types of 
flexibility are only sustainable in systems that operate with high wages, legislated 
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employment protection, and the acceptance of the interests existing within the workplace, to 
acknowledge the employee influence.  
Having reached this point, possible future research should be proposed, going beyond 
the limitations of this study. This research follows the approach recommended by Roehling et 
al., (2005) for future studies in SHRM. These authors recommended analyzing the 
interactions between specific features of human resource management systems, rather than 
looking at a fit between generic and multiple HR practices. However, a limitation on these 
studies is that they necessarily fail to consider another series of human resource practices. In 
addition, in this study we have not analyzed external fit in human resource management. 
Future research could consider the interaction between human resource management practices 
and other elements of the organization, such as firms’ competitive strategies or production 
systems. Secondly, this study is transversal, carried out at a single moment in time. Future 
research could apply a longitudinal design, using panel data to provide an understanding of 
the dynamic interaction between internal and external flexibility. Finally, we should underline 
that the empirical results are limited to industrial firms. Human resource management, in 
particular the fit between external and internal labor flexibility is different in other sectors of 
activity, such as the service sector (Cappelli and Neumark, 2004). Greater seasonality and 
variability in demand in service firms could alter the effect of this fit on firm performance. 
Future empirical research could approach this possibility, thereby enriching the interesting 
field of labor flexibility. 
 
Footnotes: 
1 Very diverse classifications have broken down these two types into different subcategories (e.g. 
Lepak and Snell, 2002; Ruiz-Santos et al., 2003; Valverde et al., 2000), and have even identified other 
types of secondary flexibility, such as financial flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson and Meager, 
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1986). However, a common feature of all these studies is their emphasis and continuous reference to 
these two essential types. 
2 More detailed information on the Survey on Business Strategies –Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales (ESEE)- characteristics can be consulted at http://www.funep.es/esee/ing/i_esee.asp. 
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Table 1. Distribution of the number of firms between sectors of activity (N = 1,403) 
SIC CNAE Number Percentage
20 and 21 DA. Food, drink and tobacco industry 187 13.33% 
22 and 23 DB. Textile and clothes industry 133 9.48% 
31 DC. Leather and shoe industry 37 2.64% 
24 and 25 DD. Timber and cork industry 51 3.64% 
26 and 27 DE. Paper industry; publishing, graphic arts and reproduction of engravings 119 8.48% 
28 DG. Chemical industry 81 5.77% 
30 DH. Rubber transformation and plastic materials industry 85 6.06% 
32 DI. Other mineral, non-metallic product industries 101 7.20% 
33 and 34 DJ. Metalworking and manufacture of metal products (reference category) 216 15.40% 
35 and 36 DK. Machinery and electrical equipment construction industry 106 7.56% 
38 DL. Electrical, electronic and optical materials and equipment industry 100 7.13% 
37 DM. Manufacturing of transport material 88 6.27% 
39 DN. Various manufacturing industries 99 7.06% 
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Table 2. Definition and descriptive statistics of variables introduced into the regression analysis  
Variable Definition Mean s.d. 
AGE Number of years since the firm was set up  24.583 20.734 
SIZE Number of employees 200.939 355.288 
DEPEND Percentage share in capital held by other firms 34.627 44.668 
DA 1 if food, drink and tobacco industry; 0 for any other category 0.133 0.340 
DB 1 if textile and clothes industry; 0 for any other category 0.094 0.293 
DC 1 if leather and shoe industry; 0 for any other category 0.026 0.160 
DD 1 if timber and cork industry; 0 for any other category 0.036 0.187 
DE 1 if paper industry; publishing, graphic arts and reproduction of engravings; 0 for any other category 0.084 0.278 
DG 1 if chemical industry; 0 for any other category 0.057 0.233 
DH 1 if rubber transformation and plastic materials industry; 0 for any other category 0.060 0.238 
DI 1 if other mineral non-metallic products; 0 for any other category 0.072 0.258 
DK 1 if machinery and electrical equipment construction industry; 0 for any other category 0.075 0.264 
DL 1 if electrical, electronic and optical materials and equipment industry; 0 for any other category 0.071 0.257 
DM 1 if manufacturing of transport material industry; 0 for any other category 0.062 0.242 
DN 1 if various manufacturing industries; 0 for any other category 0.070 0.256 
LABORINT Labor intensiveness 4.888 58.788 
IDVTAS Innovation intensiveness 0.599 1.661 
TEMP Proportion of workers with temporary contracts (casual labor) 0.160 0.199 
TRNING Spending on training per employee  75.119 185.827 
EDUC Proportion of workers with high or middle level of education  0.120 0.146 
ABSENT Hours not worked per year (because of industrial disputes, absence from work etc.) per employee 8.129 30.218 
PRODUCTV Labor productivity 1.470 0.591 




Table 3. Correlations between the variablesa 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. AGE 1           
2. SIZE 0.267** 1          
3. DEPEND 0.226** 0.371** 1         
4. LABORINT -0.024 -0.019 -0.022 1        
5. IDVTAS 0.107** 0.060* 0.129** 0.024 1       
6. TEMP -0.234** -0.073** -0.204** -0.021 -0.097** 1      
7. TRNING 0.209** 0.218** 0.280** -0.018 0.172** -0.114** 1     
8. EDUC 0.137** 0.134** 0.239** 0.015 0.184** -0.116** 0.261** 1    
9. ABSENT 0.062* 0.125** 0.132** -0.014 0.047 -0.091** 0.049 0.025 1   
10. PRODUCTV 0.074* 0.137** 0.237** -0.039 -0.042 -0.030 0.134** 0.142** -0.036 1  
11. ROS 0.139** 0.451** 0.228** -0.022 -0.005 -0.039 0.167** 0.131** 0.020 0.335** 1 







Table 4. Results of the hierarchical regression analysis (N = 1,403) 
Absenteeism Labor productivity Return on sales Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
AGE 0.081** 0.084** 0.041 0.042 -0.001 -0.001 
SIZE 0.005 0.004 -0.009 -0.011 0.414** 0.411** 
DEPEND 0.089** 0.084** 0.199** 0.192** 0.040 0.041 
DA -0.051 -0.047 0.182** 0.183** 0.007 0.001 
DB -0.002 0.003 -0.074* -0.072* -0.040+ -0.048 
DC -0.004 -0.001 0.079** 0.080** -0.017 -0.022 
DD 0.015 0.016 0.065* 0.066* -0.033 -0.034 
DE -0.064* -0.060+ -0.016 -0.014 0.013 0.008 
DG 0.005 0.022 0.073* 0.079* 0.059* 0.034 
DH -0.059+ -0.058+ 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.025 
DI -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.020 0.017 
DK -0.026 -0.023 -0.090** -0.088** 0.011 0.007 
DL 0.002 0.005 -0.042 -0.040 0.015 0.013 
DM 0.023 0.023 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
DN -0.047 -0.043 -0.047 -0.044 -0.019 -0.023 
LABORINT -0.014 -0.016 -0.034 -0.035 -0.015 -0.013 
IDVTAS 0.013 0.015 -0.070** -0.070** -0.062* -0.064* 
TEMP -0.073** -0.060* 0.003 -0.018 0.014 -0.028 
TRNING -0.013 0.032 0.047+ 0.069* 0.046+ -0.011 
EDUC -0.017 -0.015 0.087** 0.086** 0.040 0.037 
TEMP x TRNING  0.027  -0.024  -0.069** 
TEMP x EDUC  0.007  -0.045+  -0.052** 
TRNING x EDUC  -0.061+  -0.056+  0.052+ 
   R2;  F  0.040;  2.856** 0.043;  2.670** 0.151; 12.268** 0.155; 10.973** 0.224; 19.948** 0.233; 18.238** 





Table 5. Simple regression lines of the effect of external flexibility (X)) on firm performance (Y) 
depending on the level of internal flexibility 
 
Performance High internal flexibility Low internal flexibility 
Absenteeism Y = 5.823 - 1.854 X  (10.638) Y = 4.811 - 16.383 X*  (7.285) 
Labor productivity Y = 1.434 - 0.307 X  (0.196) Y = 1.250 + 0.202 X   (0.134) 
Return on sales Y = 0.086 - 0.179 X **  (0.059) Y = 0.076 + 0.126 X**  (0.040) 




Table 6. Values of the t statistic for the difference between high and low internal flexibility scenarios 
 
Firm performance t-test 
Absenteeism t = 1.126 
Labor productivity t = 2.144* 
Return on sales t = 4.290** 
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